YUVAL NOAH HARARI AND KARL POPPER ("THE MISERY OF HISTORICISM" (I))

 

"The evolutionist who demands the ‘scientific’ control of human nature does not realize how suicidal this demand is. The main spring of evolution and progress is the variety of the material which may become subject to selection. So far as human evolution is concerned it is the ‘freedom to be odd and unlike one’s neighbour’ — ‘to disagree with the majority, and go one’s own way’.Holistic control, which must lead to the equalization not of human rights but of human minds, would mean the end of progress." 

Karl Popper

 https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.190774/2015.190774.The-Poverty-Of-Historicism_djvu.txt

 

"I TRIED to show, in The Poverty of Historicism, that historicism is a poor method — a method 

which does not bear any fruit. But I did not actually refute historicism. 

Since then, I have succeeded in giving a refutation  of historicism: / have shown that, 

for strictly logical reasons, it is impossible for us to predict the future course of history. 

The argument is contained in a paper, ‘Indeterminism in Classical Physics and in Quantum Physics’, 
which I published in 1950. But I am no longer satisfied with this paper. A more satisfactory 

treatment will be found in a chapter on Indeterminism which is part of the Postscript: 

After Twenty Years to my Logic of Scientific Discovery. 

In order to inform the reader of these more recent 
results, I propose to give here, in a few words, an out-line of this refutation of historicism.

The argument may be summed up in five statements, as follows: 

(i) The course of human history is strongly influenced 
by the growth of human knowledge. (The truth 
of this premise must be admitted even by those 
who see in ideas, including our scientific ideas, 
merely the by-products of material developments of 
some kind or other.) 

(2) We cannot predict, by rational or scientific methods, the future growth of our 

scientific knowledge. (This assertion can be logically proved, 
by considerations which are sketched below.) 

(3) We cannot, therefore, predict the future course of human history. 

(4) This means that we must reject the possibility of a theoretical history, that is to say, 

of a historical social science that would correspond to theoretical physics. There can be no 

scientific theory of historical development serving as a basis for historical prediction. 

(5) The fundamental aim of historicist methods (see 
sections 1 1 to 1 6 of this book) is therefore misconceived; and historicism collapses. 

The argument does not, of course, refute the possibility of every kind of social prediction; 

on the contrary, it is perfectly compatible with the possibility of 
testing social theories — for example, economic theories 
— by way of predicting that certain developments will 
take place under certain conditions. It only refutes the  possibility of predicting historical

developments to the extent to which they may be influenced by the growth of our knowledge. 

The decisive step in this argument is statement (2). 
I think that it is convincing in itself: if there is such a 
thing as growing human knowledge, then we cannot anticipate 
today what we shall know only tomorrow. This, I think, is 
sound reasoning, but it does not amount to a logical 
proof of the statement. The proof of (2), which I have 
given in the publications mentioned, is complicated; 
and I should not be surprised if simpler proofs could 
be found. My proof consists in showing that no scientific predictor — whether a human scientist

 or a calculating machine — can possibly predict, by scientific methods, its own future results. Attempts to do so can attain their result 
only after the event, when it is too late for a prediction; they can attain their result only 

after the prediction has turned into a retrodiction. 

This argument, being purely logical, applies to scientific predictors of any complexity, 

including ‘societies’ of interacting predictors. But this means that no society can predict, 

scientifically, its own future states of knowledge. 

My ailment is somewhat formal, and it may therefore be suspected to be without any real 

significance, even if its logical validity is granted. 

I have, however, tried to show the significance of the problem in two studies. In the later of these studies. 
The Open Society and its Enemies, I have selected some events from the history of historicist 

thought, in order to illustrate its persistent and pernicious influence upon the philosophy of

society and of politics, from Hera- clitus and Plato to Hegel and Marx. In the earlier of these

 two studies. The Poverty of Historicism, now published for the first time in English in book 

form, I have tried to show the significance of historicism as a fascinating intellectual 

structure. I have tried to analyse its logic— often so subtle, so compelling and so deceptive 
—and I have tried to argue that it suffers from an inherent and irreparable weakness. 

K R P 

Perm, Bmkingharrishire, 

July 1957"

Has Yuval Noah Harari -and the West elites- refuted Popper?  

If "nobody can predict the future course of human history", how can anybody pretend 

to decide the course and direction of human history?