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Tuesday, January 27, 2026

A BRIEF ANSWER TO @SecScottBessent ON "SPANISH ENERGY" DISREGARDING ANY ACTUAL OR FUTURE GOVERNMENT

 

  • The post counters U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's remark on a 2025 Iberian blackout—attributed to excessive renewables—by adapting poet Ramón de Campoamor's verse on Spain's flag to critique energy sacrifices yielding minimal gains.
  • Bessent's interview on Real America's Voice also faults Spain for NATO underfunding and leniency toward Venezuela's Maduro regime, framing it as a broader European economic cautionary tale amid recent grid reforms.
  • The reply's closing lines—"We keep our blood yet; Preserved blood is the trade of any country"—evoke national endurance, prioritizing resource conservation over foreign judgments on policy or reliability.
  • https://x.com/i/grok/share/84df9f167a3c4872ab81daea1c2eb941

     


     

    Sunday, January 25, 2026

    LA REMATERIALIZACIÓN DE LA SOBERANÍA (CRAIG TINDALE (EL CHOQUE ENTRE HORIZONTES TEMPORALES"), (II))



    8.6 The Clash of Time Horizons

    The core pathology of Western impairment is a Clash of Time Horizons. Our system is ruled by multiple clocks that are out of sync, and adversaries have learned to play them against one another.

    The Financial Clock is measured in quarters. It demands efficiency, just-in-time inventory, and asset lightness. It rewards buybacks, not blast furnaces; SaaS multiples, not smelter uptime. This clock relentlessly pressures firms to strip slack and externalise risk.

    The Industrial Clock is measured in decades. It requires long-term capital commitments, redundant capacity, and patience for permitting and construction. A copper smelter, a TNT plant, or a titanium sponge facility lives on 20- to 40-year horizons. This clock cannot run at the speed of quarterly earnings calls.

    The War Clock is measured in days and months. It demands immediate surge capacity, massive physical stockpiles, and the ability to absorb losses at scale. On this clock, the question is not IRR but "How many shells, jets, and missiles can we field before the other side moves?"

    The Climate Clock is measured in carbon budgets and degree ceilings. It translates atmospheric physics into political deadlines: "halve emissions by 2030," "net-zero by 2050." It demands rapid decarbonization, hostility to new "dirty" heavy industry, and a bias toward visible green deployments solar farms, EVs, wind over invisible industrial resilience.

    For thirty years, we have allowed the Financial Clock and the Climate Clock to dominate, stripping the gears of the Industrial and War clocks. ESG frameworks, net-zero pledges, and CPI-targeted monetary policy all push in the same direction: de-risk balance sheets, offload emissions, and avoid long-lived "dirty" assets. The result is a system that looks virtuous and efficient on paper while quietly hollowing out the midstream and energetics that any real war effort requires.

    Beijing understands this clash and exploits it. By hosting the world’s dirty midstream, China offers Western elites a way to satisfy the Climate Clock and the Financial Clock with cheap green imports, clean domestic air, and strong ESG scores at the direct expense of the Industrial and War clocks. In essence, the West treats carbon emissions with the same detached logic it applies to smartphone supply chains: as long as the pollution and hazardous working conditions are geographically sequestered from the Western electorate, the system operates under a convenient delusion of sustainability.

    Our clocks are fighting each other; theirs are synchronized. Re-sovereignisation requires explicit policy mechanisms that bind decision-makers to the slower, heavier rhythms of the Industrial and War clocks, while integrating the Climate Clock as a constraint to be managed at home rather than outsourced abroad.

    8.7 Historical Parallels: When Powers Forgot the Material World

    The pattern isn’t new. Great powers have fallen for the same illusion before: that finance, ideology or prestige could outweigh the hard physics of industry. Every time, the correction was brutal.

    Britain’s early-20th-century mistake: finance over furnaces

    Britain entered the 1900s proud of ruling global finance. Sterling was the reserve currency; London was the world’s banker. Elites told themselves this mattered more than maintaining industrial depth. Meanwhile, Germany was building the world’s strongest chemical, steel and machine-tool sectors. When war arrived, Britain discovered that financial supremacy doesn’t produce nitrates, armour plate or machine tools. It had to rely on American steel, American explosives and American credit. Monetary power couldn’t substitute for industrial power. Echo today: The West thinks the dollar, the NASDAQ and “innovation” give it buffer room. China is playing Germany’s role: win the midstream, let financial influence follow.

    The Dutch Republic: the world’s first financialised power

    The Dutch invented the modern financial system and trusted it too much. Their economy was rich, liquid and sophisticated. But France and England built larger industrial and military systems, and the Dutch were eventually forced into strategic dependence on England. Finance gave them leverage but not depth, wealth but not autonomy. Echo today: A financialised power is fast and clever, but it is brittle without industrial mass behind it.

    The Soviet Union: abstraction outrunning material limits The USSR made the opposite ideological gamble, that political theory and military prestige could outrun material constraints. The industrial base rotted underneath it, oil revenues sagged, and the entire system collapsed under the weight of inputs it could no longer produce or afford. Echo today: different ideology, same blind spot. Ignore the material base long enough and the system stops responding to commands from the top.

    The Real Historical Rhyme

    Britain ceded industrial primacy to America. America is now ceding industrial primacy to China.But the structural difference is sharper: Britain stepped back into the hands of a friendly hegemon. The US and Europe won’t get that luxury. Every major power that believed money, theory or prestige could substitute for industry ended up reacting to the world rather than shaping it.That is the precedent that mirrors the West’s position today.

    LA REMATERIALIZACIÓN DE LA SOBERANÍA (CRAIG TINDALE (I, "WE ARE DOWNSTREAM"))

     


    The “Return of Matter” isn’t a trend, it’s the hard fork. China has already won the midstream war, the part of the industrial chain that turns raw earth into usable power. The West, lulled into believing that markets could replace industry, let itself become a quarry: rich in resources, poor in capability. What’s at stake now isn’t GDP or supply-chain resilience but political agency itself. Fail to rebuild smelters, refineries, separators, fabs and furnaces, and the West gives up the material sovereignty that underwrites democracy. The choke points China controls today become the political choke points it can use tomorrow. A society that can’t make the metals, magnets, semiconductors and fuels it relies on won’t remain free — it will be managed.
     
    The deeper problem is the ideology steering Western policy. It wasn’t “financial efficiency.” That phrase accepts the myth that market prices reflect real efficiency. They don’t. What took hold instead was a belief system that treated financial returns as the only metric that mattered and treated national capability as expendable. This wasn’t optimisation, it was disassembly. Under the banner of efficiency, whole industrial systems were hollowed out, offshored and dismantled.
     
    Financialisation became an anti-sovereign movement: a worldview that privileges capital flows over resilience, asset prices over production, speculation over capability. It made it intellectually respectable to replace blast furnaces with buybacks and call it progress. It wasn’t reallocation. It was a quiet disarmament.
     
    Now that illusion is cracking. You can’t financialise your way through a material contest. If monetary policy keeps inflating paper wealth while draining industrial capacity, the result isn’t prosperity but social erosion and strategic dependence. A civilisation that financialises everything eventually sacrifices the material base that keeps it independent.
     
    The danger isn’t that the Fed gets taken over by Beijing; the danger is that Western monetary regimes end up reacting to conditions shaped by Chinese industrial dominance. When your supply chains, price structures and investment cycles depend on a rival’s furnaces, refineries and separators, your central bank isn’t sovereign — it’s downstream.
     
    In that world, interest-rate decisions and liquidity cycles become responses to shocks you no longer control: metal shortages, export bans, midstream bottlenecks, strategic embargoes. The Fed stays American, but the constraints that frame its decisions come from elsewhere. That’s strategic dependence in the twenty-first century. Not formal capture. Material leverage.
     
    When China controls the midstream, it controls the tempo of Western inflation. When it controls the magnet chain, it controls the tempo of Western rearmament. When it controls semiconductor inputs, it controls the tempo of Western innovation.
     
    A central bank can set the price of money. It cannot set the price of matter. And once matter becomes the binding constraint, monetary sovereignty shrinks into a technical exercise conducted inside someone else’s industrial perimeter.
     
    That’s the risk worth naming: not a captured Fed, but a Fed cornered by a world the West no longer builds.
     

     

    Saturday, January 24, 2026

    JEREMY BENTHAM, DANZEMBRINCK, SÓCRATES Y "LOS DEFENSORES DEL ESTADO"

     

    La serpiente, como es sabido, puede hacer pasar todo su cuerpo por la apertura por donde pasará su cabeza: con respecto a la tiranía legal, es de esta cabeza de la que debemos guardarnos.

    (Así hablaron los abogados del Estado (Bentham) hace casi 200 años)

     

    But when the judge dares to arrogate to himself the power of interpreting the laws, that is to say, of substituting his will for that of the legislator, every thing is arbitrary---no one can foresee the course which his caprice may take. It is not enough to regard this evil in itself alone: how great soever it may be, this is a trifle in comparison of the weight of its consequences. The serpent, it is said, can cause its whole body to enter at the opening through which its head will pass: with regard to legal tyranny, it is against this subtle head that we should guard, for fear of shortly seeing displayed in its train all its tortuous folds. It is not only evil which should be distrusted, but good also, if derived from this source. All usurpation of a power superior to the law, though useful in its immediate effects, ought to be an object of dread for the future. There are limits, and narrow limits to the good which may result from this arbitrary power: there are none to the evil, there are none to the alarm, which may arise from it; the danger indistinctly lowers over every head.

    Without speaking of ignorance and caprice, what facilities for prevarication! The judge, sometimes by conforming to the law, sometimes by becoming its interpreter, may always give right or wrong to whom he pleases: he is always sure to save himself, either by the literal, or by the interpretative sense. He is a conjuror, who, to the great astonishment of the spectators, draws from the same fountain bitter waters, or sweet, as he pleases.

    This is one of the noblest characteristics of the English tribunals: they have generally followed the declared will of the legislator with scrupulous fidelity, or have directed themselves as far as possible by previous judgments, with regard to that still imperfect portion of legislation which depends on custom. This rigid observation of the laws may have had some inconveniences in an incomplete system, but it is the true spirit of liberty which inspires the English with so much horror for what is called an ex post facto law. 

     

    Principles of the Civil Code

    Jeremy Bentham

    Part 1

    Objects of the Civil Law.

        

    "Genial la observación de Danzenbrinck: los tres pueblos, griegos, romanos y judíos mataron a su mejor hombre: Sócrates, Julio César y Jesucristo. Pero la grandeza y la superioridad de los romanos se muestra en que no mataron a su gran hombre en un proceso judicial." 
     
     
     
     
     
     
    Gorgias